# Security model · WithPasskey

> WithPasskey is non-custodial by construction: private keys are generated and stored on user devices by the platform authenticator. The broker only ever sees…

Canonical: https://withpasskey.xyz/security

Locale: en

*Published 2026-11-17 · updated 2026-11-17*

WithPasskey is non-custodial by construction: private keys are generated and stored on user devices by the platform authenticator. The broker only ever sees public credential material.

- [What the broker stores](#b-h-stored)
- [What it never stores](#b-h-never)
- [Assertion guarantees](#b-h-assert)
- [Origin and redirect binding](#b-h-origin)
- [Tenant isolation](#b-h-isolation)
- [Recovery, not reset](#b-h-rec)

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## What the broker stores

- public key + signature counter per credential
- hashed server secrets (`sk\_…`are stored as SHA-256 hashes, never the secret itself)
- pairwise`sub`values (HMAC-peppered; unlinkable across applications)
- auth-request state machines with short TTLs; codes and tickets stored hashed
- tenant-scoped audit events

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## What it never stores

> **No PII, no secrets** No passwords, no email addresses, no phone numbers, no names — the schema has no PII columns. Private keys cannot be exported by design; userRef values you attach to enrollment tickets are opaque strings, not identity.

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## Assertion guarantees

- ES256 signature, kid-pinned to a rotating JWKS set;`/.well-known/jwks.json`exposes only public keys
- 120-second expiry — an assertion is evidence of a ceremony, not a session
- One-time authorization codes (60s) + PKCE S256 — interception without the verifier is useless
- acr`urn:withpasskey:acr:passkey`asserts a passkey ceremony produced the token
- jti + rid make each assertion replay-detectable

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## Origin and redirect binding

redirect\_uri must match a verified application origin exactly — scheme, host, port, path. Origins verify via DNS TXT (`\_withpasskey.<host>`) or a`/.well-known/withpasskey`challenge; local development auto-verifies`\*.localhost`. WebAuthn credentials are bound to rpId`withpasskey.xyz`— one passkey serves every verified origin of the account.

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## Tenant isolation

Every tenant-scoped table carries PostgreSQL`FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`keyed on`app.tenant\_id`— set inside each transaction, failing closed when unset. The public API role is a subject of those policies; only the worker/admin roles (separate credentials) may bypass. A compromised relying party sees only its own pairwise ids.

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## Recovery, not reset

> **No reset email exists** There is no email to phish and no reset link to intercept.`pkr-…`recovery codes are generated at enrollment, shown once, and consumed on use. If all codes are lost and no device retains a passkey, the account cannot be recovered — operators can mint a fresh code set for a known user id, which is why admin access stays out of user-facing paths.
