Security model

WithPasskey is non-custodial by construction: private keys are generated and stored on user devices by the platform authenticator. The broker only ever sees public credential material.

Table of contents
  1. What the broker stores
  2. What it never stores
  3. Assertion guarantees
  4. Origin and redirect binding
  5. Tenant isolation
  6. Recovery, not reset

What the broker stores

  • public key + signature counter per credential
  • hashed server secrets (sk_… are stored as SHA-256 hashes, never the secret itself)
  • pairwise sub values (HMAC-peppered; unlinkable across applications)
  • auth-request state machines with short TTLs; codes and tickets stored hashed
  • tenant-scoped audit events

What it never stores

No PII, no secrets

No passwords, no email addresses, no phone numbers, no names — the schema has no PII columns. Private keys cannot be exported by design; userRef values you attach to enrollment tickets are opaque strings, not identity.

Assertion guarantees

  • ES256 signature, kid-pinned to a rotating JWKS set; /.well-known/jwks.json exposes only public keys
  • 120-second expiry — an assertion is evidence of a ceremony, not a session
  • One-time authorization codes (60s) + PKCE S256 — interception without the verifier is useless
  • acr urn:withpasskey:acr:passkey asserts a passkey ceremony produced the token
  • jti + rid make each assertion replay-detectable

Origin and redirect binding

redirect_uri must match a verified application origin exactly — scheme, host, port, path. Origins verify via DNS TXT (_withpasskey.<host>) or a /.well-known/withpasskey challenge; local development auto-verifies *.localhost. WebAuthn credentials are bound to rpId withpasskey.xyz — one passkey serves every verified origin of the account.

Tenant isolation

Every tenant-scoped table carries PostgreSQL FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY keyed on app.tenant_id — set inside each transaction, failing closed when unset. The public API role is a subject of those policies; only the worker/admin roles (separate credentials) may bypass. A compromised relying party sees only its own pairwise ids.

Recovery, not reset

No reset email exists

There is no email to phish and no reset link to intercept. pkr-… recovery codes are generated at enrollment, shown once, and consumed on use. If all codes are lost and no device retains a passkey, the account cannot be recovered — operators can mint a fresh code set for a known user id, which is why admin access stays out of user-facing paths.